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Abstract
Named Data Networking (NDN) is proposed as a future Internet architecture, which
provides name-based data publishing and fetching primitive. Compared to TCP/IP, the
benefits of NDN are as follows. NDN removes the need to manage IP address; NDN
provides semantically meaningful and structured names; NDN has a stateful and
name-based forwarding plane; NDN supports data-centric security and in-network
caching. Name-based Access Control is an access control solution proposed over NDN,
which is a content-based access control by encrypting data at the time of production
directly without relying on a third-party service(i.e., Cloud storage), utilizes NDN’s
hierarchical naming convention to express access control policy, and enables automation
of key distribution.
As more and more mobile data (e.g., mobile-health data) are generated
dynamically and continuously over time and space, data owners often want to share his
data with others for data analysis or healthcare, etc. To protect their privacy, they may
want to share a subset of data based on their requirements with time and/or space
restrictions. An effective and secure access control solution is required to ensure only
authorized users can access certain data with fine granularity. Inspired by Named-based
Access Control scheme, we take into account the data attributes (time, location) to make
access decisions. In this work, we introduce a spatio-temporal access control scheme that
allows data owners to specify access control policy and limit data access to a given time
interval and/or location area. Specifically, we design a hierarchically structured naming
convention to express fine-grained access control policy on spatio-temporal data, we
realize a publish-subscribe functionality based on PSync for real-time data stream sharing,
we develop a practical spatial-temporal data access control prototype based on NDN
iii

codebase. Moreover, we run experiments using Mini-NDN to evaluate the performance of
sharing historical data from storage and sharing data in real time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, an enormous amount of spatio-temporal data are collected and stored
in different areas, for example, modern smart home systems utilize sensors to collect data
and provide services; Mobile health apps and devices generate large amounts of health
data for healthcare. This data may contain personal privacy-sensitive information, e.g.,
activity, medical conditions, and data owners desire to restrict access to their data to
ensure only authorized users can have access rights. Therefore, fine-grained access control
is required. There already exists solutions proposed in [1], [2] and [3], they are all based
on attribute-based encryption for data confidentiality and fine-grained access control.
However, they all rely on third-party services to store and share data, and have limitations,
e.g., the size of ciphertext increases linearly based on the number of incorporated
attributes. There is little attention to controlling the level of data sharing based on when
and/or where the data is produced, and no user-controlled data access with end-to-end
confidentiality.
Named Data Networking (NDN) [4] is a future Internet architecture, which
transfers the communication model from delivering data by identifying destination
through IP address to fetching data by giving the data name, and provides data-centric
security through securing the data directly instead of securing the channel where the data
is transmitted. NDN uses Interest/Data exchange model, data consumer can send an
Interest packet containing the name of the desired data to the network, any node in the
network has the requested data will return a Data packet with a cryptographic signature
along the reverse path back to data consumer. NDN has developed a set of security
mechanisms [5], which contains current solutions to data authenticity, confidentiality, and
availability, introduces a secure bootstrapping process and access control. Name-based
Access Control (NAC) [6] is proposed to provide content-based access control over NDN
by leveraging NDN’s capabilities.
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In order to develop a user-controlled access control with a fine-grained policy and
allow users to decide who can access what data at which granularity over time and/or
location. we leverage NAC scheme to have end-to-end confidentiality and enable
automatic key distribution. In this thesis, we propose a spatio-temporal access control
with fine granularity on data attributes, time and/or location. We design a structured
naming convention to express fine-grained access control policy for spatio-temporal data,
develop a practical spatio-temporal data access control prototype over NDN to support
data sharing from storage and data sharing in real time. Finally, we evaluate the
performance using Mini-NDN.
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce the
background briefly, including the existing access control works for fine-grained access
control and Named Data Networking. In Chapter 3, we describe how Name-based Access
Control works, and introduce PSync protocol. The details of our design are presented in
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we describe the implementation of our spatio-temporal prototype.
Chapter 6 includes the security analysis and the evaluation results. Chapter 7 shows the
discussion of current work with privacy concerns and some ideas for future work. In
Chapter 8, we summarize the work of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1

Existing Access Control Model for Sensitive Data
The purpose of Access Control [7] is mediating every request to data and

resources maintained by a system, and determining if the request should be granted or
denied. Access control can constrain what a user can do directly to the data with a security
policy. The policy is authored by data owner to define what should or should not be
allowed in an expressive way. Therefore, with access control, data owner could be able to
protect the data and information from being disclosed to unauthorized users, and provide
data availability to authorized users.
Recently, as more sensitive data is generated and shared, deploying access control
techniques for secure data sharing is needed. There are numerous access control solutions
proposed, e.g., role-based access control (RBAC) [8], and attribute-based access control,
see [1], [2] and [3]. However, they all rely on a third-party trusted services on the
Internet to store and share the data.
In paper [8], Sandhu et al. proposed Role-Based Access Control framework, in
which permissions are associated with roles and users are associated with roles. There are
four basic components: a set of users, a set of roles, a set of permissions and a set of
sessions. A user can be a member in an organization, while a role is a title that has a set of
permissions to perform some functions in the organization. A permission can be regarded
as the right to access a system or an object, where a session is a mapping between a user
and multiple roles. In RBAC, a central security administrator is needed to grant or delete
access permission. The task of the administrator is to grant and revoke the permissions to
the set of particular roles. Once a permission of a role is built within an organization, this
permission remains constant or changes slowly. When a new member joins the
organization, he/she will be granted permission to an existing role. When a person’s
functions change, his/her permission of the existing role will be deleted, and a set of
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permission will be granted. Once the person leaves the organization, all the permission of
his roles will be deleted.
The method introduced in [1] supports fine-grained sharing of encrypted data
using Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE), with this method, each
ciphertext is labeled with a set of descriptive attributes, and each user’s private key is
associated with an access policy. Specifically, the core algorithm of KP-ABE takes a
security parameter as input, and generates a public key and a master key. The encryptor
uses the public key for data encryption, and master key is issued by authority to users
securely and used for users to generate secret key for data decryption. The inputs of data
encryption algorithm include the data, public key, and a set of attributes, while the users
use key generation algorithm with access policy and master key as inputs to output a
secret key. Then, data decryption algorithm takes ciphertext, secret key as input, and
outputs the decrypted data if the set of attributes satisfy the access policy. Through
KP-ABE, data is stored in an encrypted form on the Internet by a third-party, such as
personal email, data stored on web portal sites Google and Yahoo. Different users are
allowed to retrieve and decrypt different pieces of data based on each access policy. The
limitation of KP-ABE is the encryptor has no control over who is granted the access to the
encrypted data, and he/she can only decide the attribute set for the data, but has to trust
some key-issuer to grant access to users.
Paper [2] presents the first construction of Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (CP-ABE) for access control on encrypted data stored in a trusted server.
Unlike KP-ABE, CP-ABE utilizes sets of descriptive attributes to combine with each
user’s private key, and ciphertext is associated with an access policy. While a third-party
server encrypts data using CP-ABE, an associated access policy will be specified. If a user
who possesses attributes which satisfy the access policy should be able to decrypt the
ciphertext. To be specific, CP-ABE algorithm takes a security parameter as input and
outputs a public key and a master key. The data encryption algorithm takes the public key,
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the data and access policy as input to output the ciphertext. The key generation algorithm
generates a secret key for users with master key and a set of attributes associated with the
user. Then the user can use the secret key to decrypt the ciphertext if the set of attributes
satisfy with the access policy. CP-ABE is conceptually more like traditional role-based
access control. Data encryptor can decide who is granted or denied access to the data, but
KP-ABE only allows data encryptor to choose the descriptive attributes for the data he/she
encrypts, and trusts a key issuer to issue private keys to users for data decryption.
Meanwhile, the size of ciphertext in both CP-ABE and KP-ABE increases linearly based
on the number of incorporated attributes.
EASiER [3] also employs attribute-based encryption to mitigate access control on
data in Online Social Networks (OSNs). Users can define different groups with different
attributes and assign keys for the groups to access their data on social networks, such as
posts, profiles, etc. Since the groups are dynamic, the attributes need to be changed all the
time, this results in key re-generation and data re-encryption frequently. EASiER presents
a method for revocation of attributes and users by using a trusted proxy. The proxy
updates a new key for each revocation. In their paper, a centralized OSN plays the role of
the proxy.
2.2

Named Data Networking
Named Data Networking [4] is proposed as a future Internet architecture, which

shifts Internet’s communication model from retrieving data by its IP address to fetching
data by a name regardless of its address. NDN provides data-centric security to secure the
data directly through signing each data packet without relying on security channel where
the data is transmitted. The name-based data distribution and data-centric security in NDN
make it possible to implement end-to-end confidentiality for data sharing. As follows, we
will introduce how the request and reply work in NDN and how trust model works to
secure the data directly.
In NDN, the request and reply work at the network layer, an Interest packet as a
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Figure 1. NDN Interest and Data Packets
request contains the requested data name, and fetches a Data packet as a reply back from
the original data producer, or in-network cache, see Figure 1.. A consumer sends an
Interest with his/her desired data name to the network, NDN routers forward this Interest
to the data producer or anyone who has the data. Once a node has the data, the node will
conduct a Data packet containing a cryptographic signature. Then, this Data packet
follows the reverse path of the Interest back to the consumer. This entire process is
enabled by NDN forwarder (Figure 2.). Each NDN router deploys an NDN forwarder
which determines whether, where and when to forward the Interest packet. The forwarder
contains three basic components, a Content Store (CS), a Pending Interest Table (PIT),
and a Forwarding Information Base (FIB). CS is utilized to store the previously retrieved
data packets, upon receiving an Interest packet, the forwarder checks if the data in CS
satisfies the Interest. If there exists such data matches the Interest, the forwarder returns
the data, otherwise, looks up Interest name in PIT. If an existing entry matches the Interest
name, the forwarder increases the Interest lifetime as well as records its incoming
interface to the entry. If there is no such entry satisfies the Interest, a new entry is created
in PIT. To fetch the desired data, that is not cached in CS, the NDN forwarder will forward
the Interest to data producer based on the information in FIB as well as the Forwarding
Strategy. The Forwarding Strategy could decide to drop the Interest packet when all
upstream links are congested, and in NFD [9], the default strategy is BestRoute, which
can forward the interest to the route with the lowest cost.

6

Figure 2. Forwarding Process at NDN node
NDN secures data by requiring data producer to sign each data packet
cryptographically. This digital signature ensures data integrity and data provenance. Data
consumer can validate the data authentication by verifying the signature without caring
about where the data is from and how it is obtained. NDN develops a hierarchical trust
model to define trust anchor, and trust rules. Trust anchor is a trusted, self-signed identity
in the network by default. Trust rules decide which identity can be used to authenticate
another one. The identity is in the form of NDN certificate, which consists of a namespace
and a public key. The identity is signed by the trust anchor to prove that it is authenticated
and authorized. Moreover, data-centric security enables content-based access control by
encrypting the data at the time of production, and distribute the keys as Data packets
automatically.
2.3

Name-based Access Control
Name-based Access Control (NAC) [6] is a content-based access control over

NDN with end-to-end security, utilizes hierarchical meaningful naming convention to
express fine-grained access control policies, and automates key distribution effectively. In
NAC scheme (Figure 3.), it assumes trust relationships among entities have been
established, each entity can authenticate data packets from other entities. Data owner
controls both data production and data access directly through access manager.
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Table 1. Notations
KEK key-encryption key, public key
KDK key-decryption key, private key
CK
Content Key, symmetric key
In NAC, there are three entities, Access Manager, data Producer, data Consumer.
Access Manger represents data owner to specify the access policies, and generate a named
public/private key pair as KEK/KDK, see notations in Table 1.. NAC leverages NDN’s
structured naming convention to express the access control policy in the KEK names.
Access Manager encrypts KDK (private key) using authorized consumer’s public key, so
that only authorized consumers with access permission can decrypt the KDK. Then, KEK
and encrypted KDK are published to the network as Data packets to satisfy incoming
Interest to fetch. Data Producer follows the access control policy from KEK name to
encrypt data, the details are as follows: After fetching KEK, Producer learns the
granularity of access control by checking the KEK name, and encrypts the data in that
granularity (granularity here is the name prefix of data produced by data producer) using a
CK, then the CK is encrypted using that KEK. Data Consumer sends Interest packets to
fetch the data he/she desires, once upon receiving the encrypted data, data consumer
learns the CK name from the Data packet, and uses CK name to fetch encrypted CK. To
decrypt the CK, data consumer fetches KDK from the network after learning KDK name
from CK data packet. Once CK is obtained, the encrypted data could be decrypted as well.
In NAC, Access Manager changes the KEKs and KDKs periodically in a short
time, that serves for access revocation. The operation of KEK/KDK renewal is transparent
to data consumers, since authorized data consumer can fetch the new KDKs by following
the naming convention automatically when needed. When a data consumer is reported to
be compromised, Access Manager will send a notification to data producer about KEK
updates, data producer will generate new CK to encrypted the existing data and fetch the
latest KEK for CK encryption. For the data published previously and stored in-network
cache, the access cannot be removed.
8

Figure 3. NAC Scheme
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Chapter 3
Design
To facilitate the explanation and discussion of our work, we introduce a simple
mobile health data sharing as an example, see Figure 4.. Data owner Bob uses a
smartwatch to collect his daily activity data, heart rate, sleep patterns, stress, and so on.
Those data are collected with the timestamp and location information to record when and
where the data are collected. Bob may want to share his data with different people
depending on his requirements. For example, Bob wants to share all his activity data
generated in the daytime with data science researcher, but except for the data from Bob’s
house, his physician could access his heart rate data in a particular time period, e.g.,
between 8 am and 8 pm daily, and his coach may be granted access to his activity data
generated only in the fitness center. These requirements contain various restrictions
related to time and/or location.

Figure 4. An example of mHealth data sharing
The goal of our work is to design and implement an access control scheme for data
owners to share their data with fine granularity over time and/or location. We name the
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data that contains time and location information spatio-temporal data, and call our access
control scheme spatio-temporal access control. This chapter describes namespace design
for spatio-temporal access control to specify access control policy over time and/or
location. We define access control policy for temporal access control, spatial access
control, and spatio-temporal access control. Meanwhile, we illustrate how the policy can
be enforced cryptographically and how the keys can be distributed automatically based on
NAC model that we use as the cryptography mechanism for contents and keys. We also
introduce the granularity of data encryption key (CK), and access revocation.
3.1

Namespace Design
Data is named under a hierarchical naming structure in NDN, this naming

structure has been used widely to support application development, routing scalability,
automatic data authentication and access control. Our access control namespace design
has several requirements: naming data semantically and meaningfully, indicating data
ownership, implying data encryption and decryption relationship. Figure 5. shows the
namespace for spatio-temporal access control. To distinguish data name with access
control namespace, we allocate access control credential namespace in parallel with data
namespace. In the naming tree, < dataowner > represents the name prefix of data owner,
e.g., “/Alice”, “/org/UofM”, < datastream > refers to the data type, e.g., health or
activity. There are two sub-namespaces under each data stream, “DATA” and “READ”,
where “DATA” contains sub-namespaces related to data: name of each data point with
time and location information, name of the content key used to encrypted the data, and
name for data synchronization.“READ” contains namespace for access control credentials.
Additionally, users’ key will be named “/<user-prefix>/KEY/<key-id>”, e.g.,
Alice’s key can be named
“/edu/memphis/gym/coach/Alice/KEY/%B9%BC%13%80%7F%B2c%11”.
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Figure 5. An example of user data namespace with access control credential namespace
3.1.1

Data Namespace
Under ‘DATA” namespace tree, there are three more branches to classify

namespace for data, encryption key (CK) and Sync namespace. Each data packet contains
a “<timestamp>” name component, “<timestamp>” name component indicates
data production or collection time, and is represented in ISO 8601 format, i.e.,
“YYYYMMDDThhmmss”. To express the location information explicitly in the data name,
we name data with two more name components “<latitude>”, “<longitude>”,
they are geographic coordinates in decimal format to specify a position of the data point
on the Earth’s surface. Data consumers can locate data producer through the data names
which are public in the network, therefore, in order to prevent unauthorized consumers
from locating the data producer, data owner could hide the sensitive location information
without including the “<latitude>”, “<longitude>” name components from data
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names, or obscure the location information using particular techniques, this will be
discussed in Section 6.
For real-time data access control, we deploy PSync [10] in spatio-temporal access
control, so that data consumers can subscribe to the name prefixes of the producer’s data
streams based on their interests. Once data producer has updates, data subscribers could
be notified, and then synchorinize the new update. The PSync namespace can be the name
of Sync Interest/Data packets, which involves a particular name component “sync”, and
a subscription list “<Subscriptionlist>” along with a “<IBF>”. “<IBF>”
represents the state of the dataset. To cooperate with PSync, each new data name in the
content of Sync Data packet has a “<Seq#>”, that encapsulates the actual data name. For
example, Bob’s coach subscribes to Bob’s activity data, will periodically sends a Sync
Interest “/Bob/activity/DATA/sync/<Subscriptionlist>/<IBF>” to data
producer. Once a new piece of data is produced at the university gym, a Sync data packet
will be sent to Bob’s coach. The Sync data packet contains the new data name with a
“<Seq#>”, e.g., “/Bob/activity/DATA/<Seq#>”. Bob’s coach then sends an
Interest to retrieve the new data for “/Bob/activity/DATA/<Seq#>”, the content of
the new data contains the actual encrypted data and the actual data name
“/Bob/activity/DATA/35.111287/-89.928124/20201020T123000”.
3.1.2

Access Control Namespace
In our access control scheme, we extend the naming convention for data

publication and consumption credentials based on NAC by including additional restritions
for data access. As we described in Section 3, there are three types of keys, KEK, KDK,
and CK. They play essential roles in enabling fine-grained access control. Under “DATA”,
there is a sub-namespace for “CK” that represents the name of content key for data
encryption. In our design, each CK can be named with a time period and/or spatial area,
the time period needs to cover the timestamp of the data that CK encrypts, and the GPS
coordinates of the data has to included in the spatial area indicated in CK name. CK can
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be changed based on granularity of access control policy. Correspondingly, the time
interval and/or spatial area in CK names will be changed as well. The time period in CK
name could be one second, one minute, or every two minutes, and spatial area could be at
a building level, e.g., gym, shopping mall. We identify the time interval by providing
“<start_timestamp>” and “<end_timestamp>” , and create a spatial area using
a center point with a radius, this information can be indicated in name components
“<center_latitude>”, “<center_longitude>” and “<radius>”. Besides,
CK data name includes additional name components “<ENCRYPTED-BY>” and
“<KEK-prefix>”, that indicate which KEK is used to encrypt the CK.
Under “READ” name component, there are two sub-namespaces applied to publish
data consumption credential, i.e., KEK and KDK. KEK data packet can be named
“<dataowner>/<datastream>/READ/KEK/<start_timestamp>/<end_
timestamp>/<center_latitude>/<center_longitude>/<radius>
/<key-id>”, which indicates the data owner, data type, and additional access restritions
related to time and location. Silimar to CK namespace, “<start_timestamp>” and
“<end_timestamp>” can be used for time interval specification, and
“<center_latitude>”, “<center_longitude>” and “<radius>” can circle a
spatial area for location. Additionly, KDK data name has the same name prefix with KEK,
but replaces the name component “KEK” with “KDK”, and appending authorized
consumer’s identity: “<dataowner>/<datastream>/READ/KDK/<start_
timestamp>/<end_timestamp>/<center_latitude>/<center_
longitude>/<radius>/<key-id>/ENCRYPTED-BY/<consumer-key>”,
where “<ENCRYPTED-BY>” indicates the KDK is encrypted using the public key of an
authorized consumer “<consumer-key>”. Each “<consumer-key>” is associated
with a certificate that has to be validated by data owner.
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3.2

Granular Access Control
Traditional access control mostly focuses on which users are granted access to

some dataset, but pays less attention to control data access based on data attributes, time
and/or location attributes. In order to protect data owner’s sensitive data from being
accessed by malicious retrievers, we need to ensure the data retrievers are granted access
to the minimum amount of data based on when and/or where the data is produced.
Fine-grained access control is required to specify who can access what data as well as at
what granularity. In our work, we provide a precise way to specify fine-grained access
control policy which encodes access constraints related to data attributes (time
and/or location), as well as have automated enforcement of such policy.
3.2.1

Access Control Policy Specification
To achieve truly user-controlled data access, data owner can define access control

policy based on their needs. Data owner can specify which subset of the data each data
consumer could be able to access based on data types and additional restrictions. Such
restrictions could be related to the spatial-temporal attributes of the data, and applied to
control data access based on when and where the data is generated. In the above example,
we can see that various data consumers are assigned various access rights, e.g., Bob’s
physician could have right to access his heart rate data generated between 8 am and 8 pm
every day, this requires access policy with spatial constraints; His coach Alice may be
granted access to activity data that is generated only in the fitness center, this needs access
policy to enclose location restriction; Bob grants data researcher access rights to his
activity data generated during the daytime, but except the data at his house, this access
requirement conbines both time and location restritions. In our access control scheme, we
support all three types of policy specification and enforcement.
We conduct a hierarchically structured naming convention (Figure 5.) to express
fine-grained access control policy with different restrictions. By following the namespace,
we could specify access control policy over time, over location, or combination of time
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and location. The access policy can determine who is granted access to what data at which
granularity. Specifically, “who is granted access” can be specified using data
consumer’s identity, and data consumer could be named based on their organization, e.g.,
Bob’s physician could be identified using a name
“/org/baptistdoctors/physician/Dave”, “/edu/memphis/cs/Cathy”
identifies an authorized user Cathy from the University of Memphis, she could be the data
science researcher. “what data” can be indicated using the name prefix of data, such as
“/Bob/activity”, “/Bob/steps”, “/Bob/heart_rate”, etc. To deal with
“which granularity”, we could encode the additional spatio-temporal restrictions
of data to specify a time interval, location, or both. The following sections will explain the
policy specifications and naming rules for each of them.

Figure 6. An example of spatial bound of fitness center
The temporal restriction can be specified based on temporal attribute and ranges,
temporal range can be represented with a start time and an end time, e.g., “between 8
am and 12 pm, 09/01/2020”. The spatial restriction could be based on spatial
attribute and a spatial bound. This spatial bound could be at a building level,
neighborhood level, or city level, represented using a center point (latitude and longitude
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GPS coordinate) and a radius(in meters). e.g., “center_latitude:
35.121196,center_longitude:-89.938124,radius:50” could be used to
locate the spatial bound as a circle to represent the fitness center at University of
Memphis, see Figure 6..
3.2.2

Temporal Data Access Control
For temporal data access control, users can define access control policies with

temporal restrictions to determine data access based on when data is generated. Figure 7.
presents the temporal policy structure, where “Data Type” can be filled with name
prefix of the data, “User ID” can be the name prefix of data consumer’s identity, and
“Schedule” is populated with a list of time schedules. Each time schedule can specify a
temporal restriction to control data access by giving “startDate” and“endDate” to
state the date constraint, “startHour” and “endHour” to indicate time constraint, and
“unit” to repeat the policy. Once temporal access control policy is settled down, data
owner can configure it to Access Manager, which can generate data production and
consumption credentials. Taking the above mHealth data sharing as an example, Bob
wants to share his heart rate data generated “between 8am to 8pm daily from
Sept 1, 2020 to Sept 2, 2020” to his physician Dave. We can fill in the policy
structure based on the policy description, where “startDate” is “09/01/2020”,
“endDate” is “09/02/2020”, “unit:day” to satisfy“daily”. “DataType” would
be ‘/Bob/heart_rate”. “UserID” represents data consumer’s identity, here Bob’s
physician name is“/org/baptistdoctors/physician/Dave”.

Figure 7. Temporal Access Control Figure 8. Temporal Access Control Naming Rules
Policy
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Figure 8. lists the naming formats for production and consumption credentials
(CK, KEK, KDK) by following the namespace design above, the time period
“StartTimestamp” and “EndTimestamp” can be indicated from time schedules.
However, in temporal data access control, the access policy is only relative to temporal
constraints without spatial information. Our access control naming convention is still
applicable without conflicts. To be consistent with the namespace design, we use symbol
“*” to populate the name components for a spatial bound. Figure 9. shows the KEK
names generated based on the access control policy assigned to Dave.

Figure 9. KEKs for Different Dates
In temporal access control, data owner can control access based on temporal
limitations. This could lead to overlapping of time intervals. For example, Bob may only
want to share his activity data with his coach Alice “between 8am to 12pm, Sept
1, 2020”, but with his physician Dave “between 8am to 8pm, Sept 1,
2020”. In this case, access manager could divide the access control policies into multiple
KEKs/KDKs to avoid conflicts, and ensure that consumers can have the appropriate
access privileges by getting corresponding KDKs, see Figure 10.. Access manager
generates two KEKs for “8am-12pm” and “12pm-20pm” accordingly, and encrypts the
KDK between 8am and 12pm using Dave’s key and Alice’s key separately , but only
encrypt the KDK between 12pm and 20pm using Dave’s key, so that only Dave can have
access permission for that period.
3.2.3

Spatial Data Access Control
In spatial data access control, users can specify access control policy with spatial

limitations to control data access based on where the data is produced. Spatial access
control policy could be specified using a specific structure as well, see Figure 11., where
“DataType” and “UserID” are the same as the temporal access control,“Location”
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Figure 10. A Sequence of KEKs with Time Intervals
contains a list of spatial bounds to represent various locations, each one is indicated using
a radius and latitude and longitude GPS coordinates of a center point. For example, coach
Alice is granted access to Bob’s activity data produced at gym and sports field. Let’s
suppose, the gym is the Fitness Center at the University of Memphis, the sports field is
Liberty Bowl Memorial Stadium. The spatial bound of the gym can be represented with
its center GPS coordinates, “35.121196,-89.938124” and an estimated radius
“50m”. And, the spatial bound of the sports field can be located with a center point
“35.1210966,-89.9774275” and an estimated radius “100m”.
When we configured this access policy in Access Manager, two pairs of
KEKs/KDKs will be generated, the location information will be expressed in
KEKs/KDKs name by following the naming rules in Figure 12.. Since in spatial data
access control, access control policy has only spatial constraints, we utilize symbol “*” to
value the name components related to time interval to keep consistent with the namespace
design. The “<center_latitude>,“<center_longitude>”, and“<radius>”
name components can get filled with the spatial information in the access policy.

Figure 11. Spatial Access Control Polic

Figure 12. Spatial Access Control Naming Rules
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3.2.4

Spatio-Temporal Data Access Control
In spatio-temporal access control, access control policy combines both time and

location restrictions. Specifically, users can control access to their data based on when and
where the data is produced securely by specifying access control policy with time periods
as well as spatial bounds. Figure 13. shows the policy structure, where “DataType” and
“UserID” are the same as the spatial access control. Besides, “TimeLocation” is a
list of combinations of time schedule and spatial bound. In Bob’s mHealth data sharing
example, the data researcher Cathy has permission to access Bob’s activity data produced
at CS department only in the daytime “between 7:00 am and 6:30 pm” on Sept
1, 2020. We can set a time schedule based on the time interval, same as temporal access
control. Suppose the CS department is Dunn Hall at the University of Memphis, we can
represent the spatial area by giving the center GPS point “(35.121185,
89.938107)” and a radius “50m”.

Figure 13. Spatio-Temporal Access Policy

Figure 14. Spatio-Temporal Access Control Naming Rules
Our spatial-temporal access control names the credentials by following the naming
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rules in Figure 14.. Based on the naming rules, Figure 15. shows the KEK/KDK names
with location and time interval limitations.

Figure 15. KEK and KDK Names with Time Interval and Location
3.2.5

Access Control Policy Enforcement
As described in Section 2, NAC is a content-based access control model in NDN,

which we employ to carry out the access control policy in the names of KEK/KDK, and
enable the key distribution automatically. Each content is encrypted at the time of
production with a content key (CK), this CK is encrypted and published for only
authorized users who can access the content. In NDN, keys are also data that can be
fetched by a name. If a data point is encrypted using a CK, the CK name is enclosed in the
data packet which can be learned and used by users to retrieve the CK in the network. To
control access to the CK, named KEK is fetched by data producer to encrypt it. The KDK
is encrypted by the authorized user’s public key and published to the network. Figure 16.
shows the key relationship in NAC. To access the data, data consumer sends interest to
access manager to retrieve KDK, and decrypts the encrypted KDK with his/her private
key. Then, data consumer could access the CK by decrypting it using the KDK, thus
access the data after decrypting it with the CK. Figure 17. is an example showing data
access for authorized consumer who can access the data successfully, and for whom not
authorized cannot access the data, see Figure 18..
Based on NAC, we could apply spatio-temporal access control to data at any
granularity related to time and location by following the above namespace design (see
Figure5. ). To enable access control policy enforcement automatically, each piece of data
and the relevant keys are named consistently. KEK, KDK, and CK names share the same
name prefix with the data that they control access to, and the policy is expressed in
KEK/KDK names. Take Bob’s activity data sharing as an example, following the naming
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Figure 16. Key Relationship in NAC

Figure 17. Data Access for Authorized Consumer
convention above, Bob can produce a name prefix “/Bob/activity/DATA” for his
activity data, and a name prefix “/Bob/activity/READ” for consumption credentials.
Figure 19. shows an example of spatio-temporal access control policy with descriptive
details, including data set, time interval, start date, end date, time unit, spatial area
specified by center point of GPS coordinates and radius, and user information identified
by data consumer’s identity. More Specifically, this access policy can be read as
“between 8am and 12pm” from “09/01/2020” to “09/05/2020” every day,
user “/edu/memphis/gym/coach/Alice” could access Bob’s activity data set
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Figure 18. Data Access for Unauthorized Consumer
“/Bob/activity” collected from fitness center where the spatial bound can be
displayed through “center(35.121196,-89.938124)” , “radius(50m)”.

Figure 19. An example of access policy
When this access rule is assigned to coach Alice. Access Manager serves for data
owner Bob to generate named KEK and KDK pairs, Figure 20. shows the naming
convention for one pair of the consumption credentials at 01/09/2020. Access
Manager should generate 5 pairs of KEK/KDK for the same time interval, same spatial
area, but for different dates from 09/01/2020 to 09/05/2020. These five
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consumption credentials can help Bob’s coach successfully access Bob’s activity data.
Both KEK and KDK names share the same name prefix as the data they
protect,/Bob/activity/, and additional spatio-temporal constraints are appended to
the namespace. KDK name can be inferred from KEK name, but includes consumer’s
identity, since KDK is encrypted by authorized consumers’ public key. After the access
policy is issued to coach Alice, Alice can access Bob’s activity data generated at fitness
center between 8 am to 12 pm from 09/01/2020 to 09/05/2020 every day.

Figure 20. Key Naming Convention of Consumption Credential
When Bob generates one piece of data somewhere inside the fitness center, at
8:30:30 am, Sept 1, 2020, this data can be named with the current GPS coordinate
(latitude, longitude) and current timestamp “20190901T083030”, the GPS coordinates
are various, but have to be inside the spatial area we circled in the access policy.
Figure 21. shows the data namespace including the data generation timestamp and
geolocation information. Once the data is generated, we will find out a content key from
the local storage, if there does not exist such CK whose time interval and spatial area can
cover the timestamp and GPS coordinate of the data, a new CK needs to be generated to
encrypt the data. Figure 22. is the CK name with the appropriate time interval
from“20190901T083000” to “20190901T083100” and spatial area “Gym” to cover
the data. In our work, users can specify CK granularity based on the granularity of access
control policy, here CK is changed per minute, see details at Section 3.3. After the data is
encrypted using the CK, the encrypted data along with the CK name is published for
retrieval. To protect the new CK, data producer requires to fetch appropriate KEK with an
Interest name that appends the time interval and spatial area of CK name. After getting the
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Interest packet, Access Manager will look up the right KEK with “appropriate” name (see
Figure 20.), and return the KEK to data producer. Note that “appropriate” name has to
contain time interval and spatial area that cover the ones from the Interest name. Since CK
is encrypted with KEK, CK data packet name needs to enclose the KEK name prefix, see
Figure 23.. The encrypted CK is published, waiting for data consumer to fetch. Data
consumer can learn CK name from encrypted data packet, and use it to fetch CK. Upon
receiving encrypted CK, the CK data name can be used to derive KDK name prefix, which
is the same as KEK name prefix. Then, data consumer creates an Interest packet with the
derived name appending consumer’s public key name to retrieve KDK from access
manager, see KDK name in Figure 20..

Figure 21. Data Naming Convention

Figure 22. CK Naming Convention

Figure 23. CK Data Naming Convention
3.3

Granular Content Key
To enable user-controlled access control, our access control could make users

specify different granularities of encryption key. This granularity could be changed
depending on time and/or location. In Name-based Access Control mechanism, producer
encrypts the data with a symmetric key (CK), this CK is encrypted using KEK (A public
key published from Access Manager), only authorized users can retrieve KDK to decrypt
the encrypted CK. Once the user gets the CK, then all the data that are encrypted using
that CK would be decrypted and exposed to the user.
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CK could be modified depending on the granularity of access control policies. For
temporal access control, CK granularity follows the granularity of the temporal access
control policy. If the minimum unit of temporal access is one hour, the CK can be changed
hourly, or finer (e.g., per minute, per second), but needs to be equal or coarser to the data
generation rate. For spatial access control, the content key could be changed based on
locations at different levels, such as building level, neighborhood level, or city level. For
access control policies with both spatial and temporal restrictions, CK granularity is the
combination of the granularity of both time and location attributes.
Let’s continue taking the spatial-temporal access policy in Figure 19. as an
example. The granularity for temporal restriction is in hour level, while granularity for
spatial restriction is at a building level. In this example, Bob generates his activity data
every second. Based on access control policy and data generation rate, we could generate
CK per minute, every two minutes, or per hour. Figure 24. shows an example of three
CKs with different granularity, where we fix spatial granularity to the building level. The
time interval in CK name indicates the temporal granularity.

Figure 24. An Example of CK Granularity
The granularity of the encryption keys (CKs) plays an important role in secure data
sharing. For example, in Figure 24., if CK is generated per minute, the time range could be
represented in CK name, e.g., “/Bob/activity/DATA/CK/20190901T083000/
20190901T083100/35.121196/-89.938124/50/<key-id>/”, this CK can
cover 60 data points produced between“20190901T083000” and
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“20190901T083100”, if this CK is compromised, those 60 data points would be leaked
as well. But if we change CK per second, one CK can handle only one data point. Once
this CK is compromised, we only leak one piece of data. Therefore, finer CK granularity
is able to protect more data from being exposed.
3.4

Access Revocation
In spatio-temporal NAC, access revocation can be handled through updating

KEK/KDK key pairs periodically, the keys renewal is transparent to data consumer, since
the keys can be fetched whenever they are needed. For example, physician Dave is
assigned access rights to read Bob’s activity data with restrictions “data is
produced between 8am to 12pm at Dunn Hall on Sept 1, 2020”,
and data researcher Cathy is granted access with restrictions “data is produced
between 14pm to 20pm at Dunn Hall on Sept 1, 2020”. With these
access policies, Dave and Cathy would be able to get the subset of data they want. In the
case that Bob decides not to share his activity data from Dunn Hall with Cathy, for
real-time data sharing, we can address this problem by limiting KDK’s effective time and
updating KEKs/KDKs in short time period, see Figure 25., KEKs are updated while
revoking Cathy’s access. The new KEKs will not be applicable to Cathy, but only for
Dave.

Figure 25. An Example of Access Revocation and KEK Updates
However, for historical data sharing from storage, if Cathy has already
downloaded Bob’s activity data before removing her access permission, there is no way to
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prevent data from accessing by Cathy. If Cathy just fetched part of the data, we could
prevent the left parts by re-encrypting them using new encryption keys (CKs).
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Chapter 4
Implementation
In NAC design, there exists an NAC code library [11], which provides a
fine-grained access control scheme based on data-specific granularity. Specifically, users
can decide which dataset can be accessed by setting the name prefix of the data as
granularity. Based on the existing NAC library and NDN C++ library (ndn-cxx) [12], we
develop a spatial-temporal access control code base for application development,
applications can control data access based on additional spatio-temporal restrictions on
data.
We have implemented a practical prototype of spatio-temporal access control over
NDN. This prototype can be applied in many situations: A smart home owner shares
sensor data with family members or friends; A personal server collects mobile health data,
shares the data with caregivers or others; A Cloud service operated by a research institute
shares a big amount of data with data scientists; and possibly others. It can also be
deployed for sharing data in real time.
4.1

Class Diagram
Figure 26. shows the class diagram based on our prototype implementation. By

summarizing the above designs about controlling access base on spatial-temporal
restrictions of data, the code library contains 10 classes. The detailed explanations are as
follows.
“AccessManager” provides interfaces for applications to insert access control
policy and generate KEKs/KDKs. “Encryptor” has functions for data encryption, CK
generation, KEK retrieval, where we generate a CK with a key length of 256bits and use
AES256 for data encryption, RSA for CK encryption. Moreover, it provides an approach
to compute a bounding box [13] identified by “[minLatitude, maxLatitude]”
and “[minLongitude, maxLongitude]” after giving a center point and a radius.
With this bounding box, applications can determine if a data point with “[latitude,
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Figure 26. Class Diagram for Spatio-Temporal Access Control Code Base
longitude]” is located within a spatial circle, then find out an appropriate CK to
encrypt that data point. “Decryptor” class can be used by data consumer for data
retrieval, and key retrieval. “DataBase” provides an SQLite database to store CKs with
name, so that CK can be looked up before generating a new CK. The database has
interfaces to store time schedules and locations from access control policies, this is useful
for later policy updates or access revocation. Other classes, such as “TimeSchedule”,
“LocationSchedule” and “TimeLocationSchedule”, provides interfaces to add
time schedules, locations, and both respectively.
Users who want to deploy this spatio-temporal acces control scheme, have to run
three different applications. A producer application is used for data owner to start an NDN
node, producing data and listening to Interests to satisfy. A manager application is used to
import access control policies, and generate consumption production credentials. A
consumer application works at data consumer’s side, sending Interest to fetch actual data
and consumption credentials. All these applications are implemented in C++, and run on
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Mac OS or Linux platform. Manger app and producer app could be run on the same node
based on user’s requirement.
4.2

Real-Time Data Sharing
In our prototype, we develop two more applications with a pub-sub module for

data producer and consumer to support real-time data sharing. Data consumer can use the
consumer application to subscribe to the data names they need, once the data is updated,
they can get a notification, and synchronize the data. This feature is imperative, with
real-time data sharing data retrievers can investigate the data immediately and take timely
actions. For example, e.g. physician needs to retrieve patients’ heart rate data in real time
for timely intervention.
In NDN, there are existing developed dataset synchronization solutions,
PSync[10], ChronoSync [14], both of them can notify end-users for new data updates and
synchronize all the new data. However, PSync supports partial dataset synchronization,
that allows end-users to subscribe to a subset of data, and only synchronize the subset of
data they need. In our access control scenario, data consumers have to be authenticated
before fetching the new data from data producers, and cannot share the data with other
consumers for terms of use and data privacy. Therefore, partial dataset synchronization in
PSync is applied, which guarantees data consumers can synchronize the new data they
subscribe, while data consumers who did not subscribe to the new data cannot be notified.
PSync utilizes an Invertible Bloom Filter (IBF) [15] to represent the latest data
names, and uses IBF ’s subtraction operation to find out the new data names efficiently.
Based on the new data names and subscriptions list, data producer sends a notification to
consumer if any new data name is matching with the subscription. Figure 27. presents the
workflow of pub-sub module after deploying PSync in our spatio-temporal access control.
1) Data consumer sends a routable Sync Interest to data producer, the Interest name
contains a subscription list “<SL>” and “<oldIBF>”, e.g., Bob’s activity data is
subscribed by someone, “/Bob/activity”; 2) Once data producer gets the Sync
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Interest, he/she compares the old IBF with current IBF, and discovers the differences
between them. When a new data is produced with a name matching with one of the
subscription list, data producer sends a Sync reply with new data name to the consumer;
3) Upon receiving the Sync reply, data consumer checks if the new data name belongs to
his/her subscription list, if there exists a false positive, that data name will be ignored,
otherwise, data consumer sends Interest packet using the new data name as Interest name
to retrieve the new data; 4) Data producer returns the new data, which encloses the actual
encrypted data packet with the actual data name.

Figure 27. Pub-Sub Workflow in Spatio-Temporal Access Control
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate spatio-temporal NAC by analyzing the security
properties and performance.
5.1

Security Analysis
Data consumer compromise: First, NAC executes access revocation periodically

in a short time, and renews KEK/KDK key pairs. When a compromised data consumer is
reported, he/she will not be granted new access rights. Second, we can specify CK
granularity finer than the granularity of the access policy, the finer CK can cover lesser
data points, when the CK is compromised, lesser data gets exposed.
Data consumer as attacker: Data can only be accessed by authorized consumers.
Data consumer’s identity needs to be validated before assigning the access policy through
university email address, or phone number, etc. Besides, every sensitive data and keys
(CK, KDK) are encrypted.
5.2

Performance Analysis
Regarding the performance of our spatio-temporal NAC, we evaluate data sharing

from storage and data sharing in real time by running Mini-NDN [16] experiments.
Mini-NDN is an NDN emulation tool that enables experimentation and testing on NDN
platform. It is coded based on Mininet [17], and NDN-related libraries released by NDN
project, such as NFD, NLSR, and NDN tools. With Mini-NDN, we could build NDN
topologies with hundreds of nodes that can be run on a single machine (laptop, local VM,
Cloud server, etc) directly to emulate an NDN network on a single system. Those nodes
are connected via virtual Ethernet interfaces. We could configure a topology file by
populating “[nodes]” and “[links]” sections based on our requirements. Figure 28.
shows a simple Mini-NDN topology configure file and the topology it describes.
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[nodes]
a: _ radius=0.5 angle=2.64159265359
b: _ radius=0.6 angle=3.64159265359
c: _ radius=1 angle=1.57079632679
d: _ radius=1 angle=4.71238898038
[links]
a:b delay=10ms
a:c delay=10ms
b:d delay=10ms

Figure 28. An Example of Mini-NDN topology
5.2.1

Experiments
Data Collection. We generate a sample of GPS data stream through MD2K Could

platform (CerebralCortex) [18], which could specify the locations where the GPS data
stream is collected. Therefore, the data stream contains a timestamp and GPS coordinates.
There are 2000 data points, each data is generated per second.
Experimental Topology. To have a large NDN network for performance
evaluation, we create a star topology with 101 nodes and 100 links, where we run data
producer and access manager in the center node, and all other nodes are running for data
consumers, the delay for each link is in the range between 10ms and 20ms. We use
ndnsec [19] toolkit to generate a pub/pri key pair for each node, this can be used for later
KDK encryption.
Access Policy. In our experiments, we define one access control policy which is
applicable for all data consumers for easy deployment. To be specific, based on the dataset
we collect, our policy description is “access the GPS data stream
generated between 8am and 12pm at Dunn Hall on 09/01/2020”.
Evaluation Metrics. In our evaluation, we consider the following metrics for
non-real-time data sharing and real-time data sharing.
• The number of CK. By specifying different CK granularities, we compare the
number of CK that we need to generate for data encryption.
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• Sync Delay. Data synchronization delay, the time between new data is updated by
data producer and notification is received by data consumer .
• Data Production Time. When a new data point is generated, through our access
control, data producer secures the data by encrypting it using a symmetric key. We
measure the runtime overheads of encryption process, it includes CK generation
(32-bytes key), KEK retrieval, CK encryption (RSA2048), and data encryption
(AES256).
• Data Consumption Time. When data consumer receives encrypted data, the data
consumption involves CK retrieval, KDK retrieval, CK decryption (RSA2048), and
data decryption (AES256).
• Communication Delay. The cost for data transmission between data producer and
data consumer.
• Data retrieval time. It is the total time for data consumer to access each piece of
data through spatio-temporal access control.
5.2.2

Evaluation Results
We run our experiments using Mini-NDN by setting up NDN topology. Figure 29.

shows the count of CK we need to generate while changing the granularities. In our
experiment, we change the CK granularity based on the time attributes, since our data
stream is collected per second, we change CK every 1s, every 2s, every 3s, so on and so
forth. The tradeoff occurs between finer granularity and the number of CK generated.
Coarser granularity generates less CKs, for the same amount of data sharing, this makes
one CK cover more data, once the CK is compromised, more data will be exposed. For
instance, when the data is collected per second, the CK granularity is 1 hour, one CK can
cover 3600 data points, once it is compromised, those data would be leaked as well. If we
change the granularity to 1s, then even the CK is exposed to attackers, we prevent more
data points from further leakage.
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Figure 29. Total Number of CK for Different Granularity
Figure 30. shows the average time cost for each data synchronization with
different time-based CK granularities. As CK granularity becomes coarser, the sync delay
changes a little, the time difference could be negligible. The average sync delay for each
data point is about 15ms.
We measure data production time cost by changing CK granularity over time for
real-time data sharing and non-real-time data sharing of 2000 data points and take the
average time as a result. As we can see in Figure 31., the data production time for both
data sharing has no big difference at each CK granularity, since the process for each data
production for sharing data in storage and in real-time is the same. However, as the
granularity becomes coarser, the time becomes less, this is caused by the tradeoff of CK
granularity. The coarser CK can cover more data, we can save time for symmetric key
generation(32-bytes key).
Each data consumption time is similar as well, see Figure 32., since the process for
each data consumption for both sharing data in storage and in real-time is the same.
However, the same tradeoff occurs at data consumer side, when data consumer decrypts a
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Figure 30. Sync Delay for Different Granularity

Figure 31. Data Production Time for Different Granularity
CK, if that CK is coarser, it can be used to decrypt more data, we save the time for new
CKs and KDKs retrieval, as well as CK and KDK decryption. This makes data decryption
more efficient. Figure 33. shows the transmission cost between consumer and producer,
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the average time for each piece of data is about 30ms. Figure 34. shows the result of data
retrieval cost, the average time for accessing 2000 data points. For real-time data sharing,
it takes more time to access each data point than sharing historical data from storage due
to the sync delay. Overall, using coarser CK can provide more performance impacts than
finer CK, but if coarser CK gets compromised, more data will be exposed as well.

Figure 32. Data consumption Time for Different Granularity
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Figure 33. Communication Delay for Different Granularity

Figure 34. Data Retrieval Time for Different Granularity
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Chapter 6
Discussion and Future Work
First, in our design of the naming convention, we include user’s location
information as name components in the namespace of KEK, KDK to express access
control policy, and in the CK namespace to specify location-based granularity. The
location information may be sensitive and personal, e.g., user’s home address, and in
NDN, data is fetched by giving the data name, so attackers can sniff the data packets and
extract the location information of the user. To prevent location information exposure, we
can obfuscate the name by using an encryption function or hash function, only authorized
users are able to derive the real data name. Some name obfuscation solutions are proposed
[20]. We leave the development of name obfuscation as future work.
Second, in our prototype implementation, we specify a spatial area/location by
providing a center point and a radius in access control policy manually, this is configured
by entering the center GPS coordinate and radius. A user-friendly and usable interface is
needed for data owners to geo-locate a spatial bound through a map (e.g. Google map)
directly, and specify a certain data type, data consumer, time interval through the
interface, which can convert the input information into access control policy internally. In
addition, the location constraint may be continuous, e.g. a path from location A to
location B. We will figure out a way to express such constraints.
Third, in our performance evaluation, we only focus on changing the CK
granularity over time, e.g., 1s, 2s, 1m. The location granularity is fixed at a building level.
In real world, mobile data could be generated in a neighborhood, city, or country level.
Meanwhile, we will expand multiple access policies in the experiment. We leave the
experimentation and evaluation work for exploration in future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
As an enormous amount of sensitive data sharing is a growing trend, the design
and development of a secure access control scheme for spatio-temporal data sharing is
necessary. To protect the data privacy, and ensure only authorized users can retrieve the
data. In this paper, we design a spatio-temporal access control scheme based on existing
Name-based Access Control over NDN, and develop a practical access control prototype
for deployment and evaluation.
Our spatio-temporal NAC provides a hierarchically structured naming convention
to describe fine-grained access control policy over time and/or location, which enables
user-controlled access control on the level of the data sharing, not just on who can access
the data. This work leverages the existing content-based access control scheme and
synchronization solution in NDN, to allow data owners to share existing data from storage
as well as share data in real time. We evaluate a preliminary prototype through security
analysis and running Mini-NDN experiments, the result shows that our spatio-temporal
NAC can achieve data sharing efficiently and securely.
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